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One needs to understand the history of U.S. biotechnology regulations in order to comprehend the present regulatory structure. It all began with 
the recombinant DNA research in the early 1970s. At that time the hazards of 
the research were not known and the scientific community formulated its own 
program for biosafety oversight, managed through the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), coordinated through the Recombinant DNA Advisory Com-
mittee (RAC), and operated through a distributed network of Institutional 
Biosafety Committees. The NIH-RAC evolved a series of guidelines for re-
combinant DNA research that has become the standard for contained labora-
tory experimentation.
After a decade of successfully using guidelines and institutional over-
sight, the technology followed its normal sequence of activities leading to 
small-scale testing to be conducted outside of laboratory containment. Quite 
independently, but coincidentally, the National Research Council (NRC) pub-
lished the “Redbook” (NAS, 1983) which set out a new paradigm for risk
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analysis. It is important to understand the dimensions of the NRC risk para-
digm because it directly influenced subsequent policy decisions regarding 
the regulation of biotechnology.
PRINCIPLES OF RISK ANALYSIS
The risk paradigm provided in the “Redbook” described the process of risk 
analysis as being made up of:
Risk Assessment 
Risk Management 
Risk Communication
The sequential steps in risk assessment are: the identification of a hazard, fol-
lowed by an assessment of exposure, and then risk characterization. Exposure 
is made up of fate and effects, when the focus of the assessment is on the envi-
ronmental release of an organism. Conceptually taken together the identifi-
cation of a hazard times the exposure is the characterization of a risk, or:
Risk Characterization = Hazard x Exposure, 
when
Exposure = Fate x Effects
Risk assessment should be conducted with a sound scientific basis and use 
inferences as appropriate.
Risk management is the process of determining what to do about a char-
acterized risk. This includes risk prevention, as well as the identification, se-
lection and use of mitigating measures to reduce risk. Environmental risk 
management considerations often include social, economic and political 
judgements. The process of risk management should be institutionally sepa-
rated from risk assessment.
Risk communication is an interactive process that promotes the ex-
change of information and opinions about risk among individuals, groups 
and institutions. This process should include providing access for stake-
holders, or participation by and appreciation of public perceptions of risks.
THE FEDERAL COORDINATED FRAMEWORK
As the process of biotechnology research approached small-scale testing out-
side of contained laboratories, the Executive Branch of the Federal govern-
ment began extensive discussions on how to coordinate regulatory activities 
to assure adequate protection of public health and the environment vis-a-vis 
biotechnology (ca. 1984). One of the foundations of the Federal Coordi-
nated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology (OSTP, 1986) is that the 
regulatory decision should be risk-based, and thus was set in motion the 
process of applying the “Redbook’s” principles for risk analysis.
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The first step in risk analysis is the identification of a hazard. It was 
clearly evident to the Federal Coordinated Framework policymakers that 
not all biotechnology represented a hazard. For instance, the application of 
somaclonal variation to crop improvement was definitely biotechnology, but 
it did not represent an unusual hazard. Additionally, some activities in re-
combinant DNA biotechnology were accepted as no, low or reasonable risk, 
and therefore these were not prime candidates for regulation.
What was identified was the fact that 
some products of biotechnology may repre-
sent an unusual hazard. Thus, these prod-
ucts should be the subject of risk assessment 
and regulation. It was therefore asserted that 
the products of biotechnology, not the pro-
cess, should be the focus of Federal biotech-
nology regulation.
This distinction eventually became misconstrued by a few zealots of the 
Federal Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology. They 
took the principle one step further, in an inept attempt to obliterate the dis-
tinction between conventional methods and the new biotechnologies. A ter-
minology mind-game reminiscent of the popular book 1984 (Orwell, 1949), 
dominated Federal regulatory terminology during the Bush Administration. 
The use of common scientific terms like “genetically modified organisms,” 
“transgenic” and “genetically engineered,” was forbidden in regulatory lan-
guage. As policy was derived from the Federal Coordinated Framework, 
some creative terminology had to be invented by technical editors (e.g.,“de-
liberately modified hereditary traits”) to comply with these policies.
Another primary principle of the Federal Coordinated Framework was 
that there would be no new laws. This principle was derived from the as-
sumption that existing statutory authorities were sufficient for Federal regu-
latory agencies to regulate the products of biotechnology. In the beginning 
this made a lot of sense. The first applications of biotechnology were emerg-
ing as pharmaceuticals and drugs, and this industry had long been regulated. 
Thus, there was considerable resistance on the part of the drug industry to 
biotechnology regulation per se, inasmuch as the existing regulatory struc-
ture seemed clearly sufficient.
This was not however the case for much of the rest of the applications 
of biotechnology, especially in agriculture. Much of the agriculture research 
enterprise had never been regulated, and existing authorities to deal with 
clearly identified special threats (such as plant pests; pesticides; toxic sub-
stances; animal viruses, serums and toxins; meat and poultry inspections; 
and food additives) stretched this eclectic collection of authorities over the 
domain of agricultural biotechnology. This became a challenge that has
Risk assessment should 
be conducted with a 
sound scientific basis 
and use inferences as 
appropriate.
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pretty much been met successfully. This success was achieved through the 
promulgation of new regulations under existing legislative authorities, indi-
vidual efforts and a commendable level of interagency coordination to get 
the job done.
In spite of the extraordinary efforts to make the Federal Coordinated 
Framework fit the structure of agricultural biotechnology, some gaps and
overlaps still exist. For example, it is still not clear 
how transgenic fish will be regulated, either in the 
research stage or as commercial products. U.S. 
Federal authority for the regulation of aquatic 
species is yet to be resolved, and as a consequence 
there is no existing statutory authority for fish 
and shellfish biotechnology products. Similar 
situations exist for non-pest insects, amphibians, 
reptiles, plants that have been transformed with 
sequences not from plant pests, and non-pest and 
non-pesticidal microorganisms when the re-
search has no commercial intent (e.g., some types of university research with 
rhizobium). Moreover, the final promulgation of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) authorities under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) has 
yet to take place.
Given the above considerations some have called it remarkable that the 
Federal Coordinated Framework has been so successful for agricultural bio-
technology regulation. A lot of the credit for this success goes to a few people 
in the Federal regulatory agencies that have given extraordinary effort to 
make it succeed.
If the regulation of 
biotechnology is to be 
risk-based, a clear and 
general agreement on 
what constitutes a 
hazard needs to be 
reached.
THE NEXT GENERATION
As the technology progresses through its normal sequence, many of the prod-
ucts of agricultural biotechnology are ready for larger-scale performance test-
ing, pre-commercial evaluations and eventual commercialization. As a con-
sequence there are considerations that go beyond small-plot testing during 
these subsequent stages of product development that will place further strain 
on the processes of the Federal Coordinated Framework. Certainly the expe-
riences and knowledge gained from small-scale testing can be used to better 
predict performance in larger-scale testing and commercial use, but not ev-
erything is directly translatable. The identification of the hazards of large- 
scale testing, the consideration of exposure, the numerics of large popula-
tions, and the probability values for fate will all take on new dimensions in 
large-scale tests. The question now being asked is: Is the Federal Coordinated 
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology fully adequate to address today’s 
and tomorrow’s questions regarding the risks of biotechnology?
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As the question on the Federal Coordinated Framework’s adequacy is 
asked, is this the time to revisit the fundamental principles upon which it rests?
The regulatory issue of product versus process is not truly a settled issue, 
at least in the minds of many. The process of biotechnology and the trans-
forming of organisms with foreign DNA represents to many an identified haz-
ard requiring risk analysis. This perspective is no doubt related to the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) May 1992 request for more public 
comment on its policy regarding the labeling of foods derived from new 
plant varieties. The FDA wants to know:
—Should all foods derived from new plant varieties developed using 
“genetic engineering” techniques be required to be labeled as such?
—Should labeling the source of introduced DNA be required?
—Under what circumstances is ingredient labeling appropriate?
—How can required labeling for food allergies be accomplished?
—What are the practical difficulties and economic impacts of labeling 
“genetically engineered” foods?
Clearly the regulatory issue of hazard identification for biotechnology is not 
resolved. Different perspectives on what constitutes a hazard complicates the 
development of a consensus. Without completing the first step of risk as-
sessment, the application of scientific objectivity to the rest of the process 
will not be sufficient for those with opposing views.
WHAT IS NEEDED?
If the regulation of biotechnology is to be risk-based, a clear and general 
agreement on what constitutes a hazard needs to be reached. This involves 
reconciliation of the different views of the world where commercial interests 
advise the use of marketplace determinants; regulators prefer the use of a 
hierarchial, authoritative decision-making process; scientists assert the need 
for a rational process; and those concerned for the environment wish to apply 
a natural standard to the identification of a hazard.
Adding further complication is how different standards of objectivity are 
judged. Scientific objectivity is based on standardized techniques which per-
mit experimental reproducibility. Social inquiry studies are considered objec-
tive if devoid of personal bias. Legal proceedings are considered objective if 
the participants adhere to the principle of disinterestedness. A lawyer would 
hardly view a scientist as objective if the scientist has an interest in that brand 
of science. Conversely, a scientist would accuse the lawyer of being subjective 
if the judgements were not truly reproducible. Social scientists share similar 
concerns for jurisprudence and biological science as they do not see them as 
necessarily free of personal bias. Who then is to provide objective judgements 
for biotechnology regulation?
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Until we can resolve the issues of what constitutes a biotechnology haz-
ard and who will make the objective judgements, it is not very likely that a 
consensus will emerge on how to proceed.
CONSENSUS BUILDING
Figure 1, taken from Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) presents the four prob-
lems of consensus building in risk analysis. In each of the four cells there is 
represented a risk problem, and a proposed solution. The dimensions of the 
block are knowledge and consent. In the upper left cell knowledge is certain 
and consent is complete. If there is a technical problem, it is merely a matter 
of making a calculation to derive a solution.
In other circumstances knowledge is uncertain, although consent is 
complete (upper right cell). In these situations the problem is not enough
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information and the indicated solution is to conduct risk assessment re-
search to resolve the problem. This is the approach that the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) has implemented through Section 1668 of the 1990 
Farm Bill. The USDA sets aside 1.0 percent of its biotechnology research 
outlays to conduct risk assessment research to fill knowledge gaps. This year 
the Department will award competitively $1.7 million for risk assessment re-
search projects to help facilitate science-based, regulatory decision-making.
In those cases where knowledge is certain, but consent is contested, the 
problem becomes one of disagreement and the solution is dialogue (lower left 
cell). The role of organizations such as the National Agricultural Biotechnol-
ogy Council (NABC) is very important in this type of circumstance. Through 
public dialogue, understanding can be built on existing, certain knowledge 
and perspectives of divergent views being more clearly understood.
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It is the fourth cell (lower right cell) that represents the most difficult 
situation. In this case knowledge is uncertain and consent is contested. 
Presently, there is not a good solution for this type of situation. Clearly dia-
logue would be desirable. And more research might help resolve the un-
known. But bringing together the information and divergent views for prob-
lem resolution represents one of the most tricky responsibilities facing sci-
ence, government, public and private institutions, and the concerned public.
WHAT IS BEING DONE?
Discussions are now underway as to the adequacy of the Federal Coordinat-
ing Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology. As research discoveries 
progress along the path to commercialization, closing the information gaps, 
eliminating unnecessary duplication, and deregulating technologies known 
to be safe seem to be important items for our national agenda. Some of these 
changes can be seen with the recent implementation of an Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) notification and petition process for 
plant biotechnology regulation under the Plant Pest Act authority.
Also, the USDA’s Marketing and Inspection 
Service is meeting with the FDA to coordinate new 
regulations for meat and poultry biotechnology 
and to close the gap for fish and shellfish. This 
latter gap may however require new legislation and 
this would represent a departure from a major 
principle embedded in the Federal Coordinated 
Framework. Other existing regulatory gaps may 
require similar gap-filling legislation.
There is clearly a need for more biosafety information exchange, both 
nationally and internationally. The Stockholm Environmental Institute re-
cently established a free advisory service for Third World countries wishing 
an evaluation of the safety of field tests with genetically modified organisms. 
U.N. agencies are now looking at their role in information support systems for 
biotechnology on a global basis. The Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development is continuing to provide international leadership on the 
principles of biotechnology regulation and safety, and the European Eco-
nomic Committee is working with the U.S. government to coordinate re-
search and regulatory activities.
A major issue in these efforts is the extent to which the U.S. scientific 
community can and should become involved in the international exchange 
of information. If biotechnology is expected to be a major advantage in U.S. 
competitiveness in global markets, how much information should the U.S. 
share, given the advantage of a technological lead? Opportunities to collabo-
rate in biotechnology risk assessment, biosafety data exchange, and regulatory
There is clearly a 
need for more 
biosafety informa-
tion exchange, both 
nationally and 
internationally.
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practices seem to be obvious areas for international collaboration for mutual 
benefit. But to be successful, greater organizational and financial support 
for such international collaboration is needed.
There is a clear need for national educational programs in biotechnol-
ogy that would organize factual information to be shared with the interested 
public, both youth and adult. The USDA’s National Biological Impact As-
sessment Program is sponsoring a pilot project with the University of 
California,Davis, targeting school-age children with teaching materials on the 
scientific principles of biotechnology. The Agricultural Research Institute 
is looking for partners to assist in the development of a biotechnology educa-
tional program focused on adults. These are but two examples of what has been 
started in biotechnology public education.
Finally, there is a need for more national biotechnology dialogue, as 
there is not so much the absence of factual knowledge, but clearly different 
views on values, standards and preferences. NABC should continue to play 
an important role by providing a forum for continued biotechnology dia-
logue that will hopefully diminish disagreements and build toward a consen-
sus on a national direction for agricultural biotechnology.
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